One of my students reported that he was having trouble finding my lecture notes from this course, so I am putting them in one place. I will update this for the last few classes.
Some of the aviation discussions are not yet here.
Its economists used to champion big firms, but the mood has shifted
Source: Schumpeter: The University of Chicago worries about a lack of competition | The Economist
There is an emerging consensus among economists that competition in the economy has weakened significantly. That is bad news: it means that incumbent firms may not need to innovate as much, and that inequality may increase if companies can hoard profits and spend less on investment and wages.
Yes, I certainly see this in tech fields.The double consequences are scary.
Thanks to colleague Prof. Liz Lyons for suggesting this.
This article describes the efforts of Facebook, Youtube, and similar hosts of user-generated content, to screen unacceptable material. (Both speech and images.) It’s apparently a grim task, because of the depravity of some material. For the first decade, moderation methods were heavily ad hoc, but gradually grew more complex and formalized in response to questions such as when to allow violent images as news. In aviation terms, it was at Stage 2: Rules + Instruments. Now, some companies are developing Stage 3 (standard procedures) and Stage 4 (automated) methods.
The NY Times says nobody knows how the FBI decrypted the infamous iPhone. That is certainly true, but there is speculation about physically opening up one of its chips and reading its crypto key. http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/03/29/us/politics/ap-us-apple-encryption.html Years ago, I looked at reverse engineering of chip designs by physically disassembling them. Here are some comments on how difficult this is, although it certainly may be possible.
Physically attacking a chip is an old, but difficult, method of breaking into a system that you control. In 2008, Ed Felton and others read DRAM chips that had been turned off, by freezing them in liquid nitrogen. But they were reading the outside pins of the chip package. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/technology/22chip.html Partly to prevent that, but mostly for speed and cost reasons, processors like those inside a smart phone now include modules like graphics, cache, and security on the same die and chip. So there is no way to read such data from outside the package, unless a design has a bug.
To read signals from inside a chip, you need to figure out the logical and physical layouts of the chip, which are proprietary and, with up to 100 million logic gates, very complex. Then you need to be able to inject and read signals with a physical separation of 100 nanometers(nm) or less. By comparison, the wavelength of light is 400 nm or greater. And the chip designers knew you might try, and perhaps did their best to make it impossible. Of course, companies still attempt to reverse engineer their competitors’ chips, so some expertise does exist.
Finally, if you are physically slicing up a unique device, I would guess that one slip and you may not be able to recover. You can’t just shut off power and start over the way you can with software attacks.
Here is one example of successfully dissecting a security chip, back in 2010. It was not easy!
Something I just found for my Big Data class.
Machine learning system aims to remove problem players “within 15 minutes.”
An interesting thread of player comments has a good discussion of potential problems with automated bans. Only time will tell how well the company develops the system to get around these issues.
This company also took an experimental approach to banning players. And hired 3 PhDs in Cognitive Science to develop it. (Just to be clear, their experiments did not appear to be automated A/B style experiments.) After the jump is a screen shot from that system.
But, I’m not tempted to play League of Legends to study player behavior and experiment with getting banned! (I don’t think I’ve ever tried an MMO beyond some prototypes 15 years ago.) If any players want to post your observations here, great.
I’ve probably purchased 300 books in the last year for research purposes, not to mention all the fiction my wife gets (and so do I, if it costs $3 or less). For the newer ones , buying them as eBooks is generally an option. But the state of software, DRM, and copy protection for Kindle books is a mess. Kindle’s software (like iBooks) is deliberately crippled – no copying into another document, no printing, and especially no way to copy diagrams. I’m running Kindle’s software on my Mac and on an iPad, rather than using a Kindle tablet, but that barely helps.
(I wrote this primarily for friends and colleagues. I’m posting it on my blog for efficiency/discussion/amendment.) My IT manager recently sent around a warning about phishing attacks. (And I just attended a scary CSE seminar on spear-phishing — but that is another story.) Among his advice was:
You should use a strong password on all UCSD accounts and you should never use the same password on any other account you have,
That’s perennial advice that is both good and impossible. It’s good because many (most?) web sites keep making security mistakes that lead to massive breaches, exposing millions of passwords at a time. (The recent+ 100 million account breach at Target, for example.) It’s impossible because we have a decade or more of experience, research, and discussion that says using unique passwords for each login is completely impractical, and nobody actually does it. Continue reading