Gina Kolata in the NY Times has been running a good series of articles on fraudulent academic publishing. The basic business model is an unholy alliance between academics looking to enhance their resumes, and quick-buck internet sites. Initially, I thought these sites were enticing naive academics. But many academics are apparently willing participants, suggesting that it’s easy to fool many promotion and award committees.
All but one academic in 10 who won a School of Business and Economics award had published papers in these journals. One had 10 such articles.
It has always been clear that Musk does not understand high-volume manufacturing. Building rockets is very hard, but building 100,000 cars is very hard for a different reason! His predicted ramp rate was absurd. In the last 6 months, I think he has started to realize this.
Tesla has little chance of hitting its 5,000 weekly output during the fourth quarter. The chief reason: Its current production line can’t build vehicles at that rate unless it runs two 10-hour shifts seven days a week, which is
Source: Tesla | Hiccups Threaten to Slow Model 3 Launch | Industry content from WardsAuto
According to the article, Tesla has also deliberately ignored much of the accumulated wisdom about how to ramp in auto production. That might be OK for his second high-volume vehicle.
More details on Tesla’s ramp plans:
Tesla now has 2 choices, both bad:
- Go ahead and start building and shipping as fast as possible. The result will be multiple problems that require expensive hardware recalls.
- Add another 6? months to the schedule to run the as a pilot line for learning, rather than for volume. Expect zero salable output during that period. (As one of the comments said, they can give/sell those cars to employees.)
TL;DR In Southern California should put PV on houses and buildings that are far from the coast, because coastal areas are cloudy much of the summer. But the actual pattern is the opposite. I estimate a 30% magnitude of loss. Even my employer, UCSD, has engaged in this foolishness in order to appear trendy.
The bumpiness of this graph shows the effects of coastal weather in August.
Elon Musk clearly has a blind spot about manufacturing. Building a giant factory for the first use of a new process does not work, and theoretically it cannot work. Even if it did work, it would be non-competitive. Once a factory is built and machines installed, subsequent new discoveries/knowledge cannot be incorporated, except at the margins.
To reach the 100-megawatt goal, sources indicate that the pilot production line in Fremont would eventually need to yield between 800 to 1,000 high-efficiency Whitney panels per day. But the team was not able to automate the process consistently enough to produce more than dozens of Whitney panels per day, according to people familiar with the matter. Most of the production resulted in “scrap,” they say. “The big problem was simply that they couldn’t scale up the technology to the point where you could run it in a factory,” a source familiar with the development explains.
Source: Can Elon Musk Get SolarCity’s Gigafactory Back On Track?
SC overturns Lexmark’s patent win on used printer cartridges. Since the 17th century, restricting resale has been “against Trade and Traffique.”
Source: Supreme Court overturns Lexmark’s patent win on used printer cartridges | Ars Technica
Summary: once a product is sold, the original patent holder can’t control how it is subsequently used.
Not the only seller.
Today’s ruling is a win for many tech companies, with companies like Vizio, Dell, Intel, LG Electronics, HTC, and Western Digital all taking the side of Impression Products. [the winner] …The companies on Lexmark’s side, no surprise, were heavy licensers of patents, including tech giants like Qualcomm, IBM, Nokia, and Dolby. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical groups also supported Lexmark. Those lineups largely mirror industry divisions over Congressional debates around reforming patent laws, with the pro-Impression companies favoring user-friendly changes to patent laws, and the pro-Lexmark companies wanting more changes that favor patent owners.
I often gripe about the Supreme Court’s seeming “go with the big $” jurisprudence. But in this case, there was plenty of corporate power on both sides. And the 7-1 verdict means it was not a close call.
One of my students reported that he was having trouble finding my lecture notes from this course, so I am putting them in one place. I will update this for the last few classes.
Some of the aviation discussions are not yet here.
I just taught the Theranos case in my course on “Innovation and Industry Development,” co-taught with Prof. Elizabeth Lyons. The first half is about positioning a startup: powerful new technology, established incumbents, how should we enter to disrupt the industry and make the world a better place? Any moderate set of numbers makes Theranos’ reputed $9,000,000,000 valuation look reasonable.
The “case” presently consists of four articles. I put together a set of overhead slides to generate and lead the discussion. The first half ends with some general lessons about disruptive innovation and whether to follow an open or closed IP strategy. The second half starts in December 2015 and discusses the crash. I also compare Theranos with the Google contact lens (another technically impossible pseudo-invention).
“That’s a type of Silicon Valley arrogance,” he said. “That isn’t how science works.” (re Google, not Theranos)